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Abstract 
 
In Reason’s, Managing the Risk of Organizational Incidents, `Reason draws on the work of other 
authors, and how awareness of the operating consequences of action is more important that 
causes of error. 
It is the intention of this paper to review some of this work, in particular in the light of current 
trends that promote Risk Management, Incident Recording and Lead/Lagging Indicators as the 
“new direction in safety management”. It will then go on to suggest why we need to encompass 
more of general management principles in the way that we think about safety in the work place 
and perhaps create new tools that move away from the Engineering model and its linear 
solutions, to an Organizational Model, where responsibility lies with the Individual rather than 
the System. 




In 2016, I asked a Masters Chemical Engineering student to consider major process safety events 
over the past 25 years, to consider whether there were common patterns across 20+ incidents by 
applying principles from good audit practice set. We hoped to then factorise these against 
frequency and build a model of a predictive nature. 
 
What we discover was that the influencing factors could be set out into design, safety processes, 
management practice, legislator demands, Safety models, current development or trends. 
 
As part of this work, we set out Stages in Safety Practice (SP) as follows: 
 
1. F (Materials of Construction (Mc), Property of Materials (Pm), Reaction Kinetics (Rk), 
Effect of Fires & Explosions (Efe)),  
 
2. HAZOP (Hz), LOPA (Lpa) 
 
3. Safety Case/COMAH (Sc), QRA(Qra), 
 
4. Management of Change (Mch), Swiss Cheese Model (Scm) and Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) 
 
5. Leading/Lagging Indicators (Lli), Stress Cracking (Scr), Management of Safety 
Competence (Msc) 
 
This could be written in a quasi-Equation of State as;    
 
SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe, Hz, Lpa, Sc, Qra, Mch, Scm, Lli, Scr, Msc  ]  
 
and my source of reference: Perry, Lees, CCPS (Eng. Design for Process Safety) Kletz (What 
went wrong), IChemE (Hazop), Reason (Human Factors), CCPS (Implementing Process Safety 
Management System), CCPS (Integrating Management Systems & Metrics to improve Process 
Safety Performance) and 30 other books on my shelf but lastly Dekker [2] (Drift into Failure)  
 
It was perhaps now impossible to codify as we had thought because of the many factors 
involved, and had to rethink out linear simple engineering tool approach. 
Yet on re-reading Dekker and Reason, we arrived at a tentative link between Management of 
Safety Competence (Msc), Safety Space and Drift into Failure. 
Discussion 
To understand why there is perhaps a theory with considering, it’s worth considering some of the 
writings on the causes of what is often referred to as an Atrophy of Progress and the lessons that 
need to be drawn. 
Charles Perrow [3], an organizational theorist, suggests a bleak proposition that “accidents are 
inevitable in complex, tightly-coupled systems ……...regardless of the skills of their operators 
and managers.” 
Hence the title: accidents in such systems are 'normal'" According to Perrow the redundancies 
that go to make up defences-in-depth have three dangerous features. 
1. Redundant defensive back-ups increase the interactive complexity of high-technology 
organizations and thus increase the likelihood of unforeseeable common-mode failures. 
While the assumption of independence may be appropriate for purely technical 
breakdowns, human errors at the 'sharp end', in the maintenance sector and in the 
managerial domains are uniquely capable of creating failures that can affect a number of 
defensive layers simultaneously" 
2.  Adding redundancy makes the system more opaque to the people who nominally control 
and manage it. Undiscovered errors and other latent problems accumulate over time and 
increase the likelihood of the 'holes' in the defensive lining up to permit the passage of an 
accident trajectory. This alignment of the gaps can be created either by interactive 
common-mode failures or by the simultaneous disabling of supposedly independent 
defences, as at Chernobyl. 
3. As a consequence of this dangerous concealment, and because their obvious engineering 
sophistication, redundant defences can cause systems operators and managers to forget to 
be afraid. This false sense of security prompts them to strive even higher levels of 
production. Fixes including safety devices, often merely allow those in charge to run the 
system faster, or… with bigger explosives” 
 
Karl Weick reinforces this view of unstable systems in control and tells us that “We know that 
single causes are rare, but we don't know how small events can become chained together so that 
they result in a disastrous outcome. In the absence of this understanding, people must wait until 
some crisis actually occurs before they can diagnose a problem, rather than be in a position to 
detect a potential problem before it emerges. 
To anticipate and forestall disasters is to understand regularities in the ways small events can 
combine to have disproportionately large effects.” [4]  
In taking forward this view, we appear to set ourselves a challenge of inevitable failure and if 
one were to take a pessimistic view of the safety history of the process industries then this may 
well be the case. Although this is where Reason[5] brings us and this papers challenge in 
“Making Sense of Reason”. His “Safety Space” is a natural extension of the resistance-
vulnerability continuum introduced in the previous section. It is a boundary within which the 
current resistance or vulnerability of an individual or an organization is represented. As shown in 
Figure 1, it is cigar-shaped, with extreme resistance located at the left-hand end and extreme 
vulnerability at the right-hand end. The shape acknowledges that most people or organizations 
will occupy some intermediate point within this space. 
An organization's position within the safety space is determined by the quality of the processes 
used to combat its operational hazards. In other words, its location on the resistance-vulnerability 
dimension will be a function of the extent and integrity of its defences at anyone point in time. 
However, here is no such thing as absolute safety, human fallibility, latent conditions and the 
possibility of chance conjunctions of these accident-producing factors continue to exist, even the 
most intrinsically resistant organizations-those at the extreme left-hand end- can still have 
accidents. By the same token, 'lucky' but unsafe organizations at the extreme right-hand end of 







Fig 1: The Safety Space (Reason Managing the Risk of Organizational Incidents) 
“The key to navigating the safety space lies in appreciating what is manageable and what is not. 
Many organizations treat safety management as a negative production process, they set reduced 
negative outcome targets for the coming accounting period (e.g., 'Next year we'll reduce our lost-
time accidents by half'), yet accidents by their nature, are not directly controllable, so much of 
their causal variance lies outside the organization's sphere of influence. The organisation can 
only defend against hazards; it cannot remove or avoid them and still stay in business. Similarly, 
an organization can only strive to minimize unsafe acts, it cannot eliminate them altogether, and 
figure 2 demonstrates some of the high level factors that need to be in place.”  
  
Fig 2: A summary of the principal factors involved in navigating the “Safety Space” with The Driving Forces and 
the Navigational Aids that together comprise the safety information system (Reason Managing the Risk of 
Organizational Incidents) 
This is where the sense of matching our studies and the link to Safety Competency where reports 
spanning 40 years highlight this common factor amongst many others from our Equation of 
State: 
Increasing Resistance Increasing Vulnerability 
 
Date Event Name 
1974 Flixborough 
1979 3 Mile Island 
1984 Bhopal,  
1986 Chernobyl 
1998 Piper Alpha 
 Longford, Australia 
2005 Texas City 
Buncefield 
2010 Deep Water Horizon/Mocondo 
Dupont Belle 
Tesoro Refinery 
2015 ExxonMobil Torrance, CA 
 Tianjin, China 
 
This analysis is supported by Baybutt’s “Insights into process safety incidents from an analysis 




Effective safety management is more like a long-term fitness programme than negative 
production. Rather than struggling vainly to exercise direct control over incidents and accidents, 
managers should regularly measure and improve those processes--design, hardware, training, 
procedures, maintenance, planning, budgeting, communication, goal conflicts, and the like-that 
are known to be implicated in the occurrence of organizational accidents. These are the 
manageable processes determining a system's safety health. They are, in any case, the processes 
that managers are hired to manage; safety management is not an add-on, but an essential part of 
the system's core business.  
Perhaps safety indictors need brought into the management world, where there is no room for 
“loss time statistics”, “leading/lagging indicators”, or current position on the “Heinrich’s Safety 
Triangle/Dashboard” and more about: 
 Did the work force feel safe at work today? 
 What did we do safely today to make the business more secure? 
 What marginal gains have we developed today to make us all safer? 
 
These are perhaps 3 from many indicators to be used by managers who normally show concern 
about the viability of their business by asking about Quality (throughput) & Financial (Cash at 
bank) indicators. 
However, there is a challenge in this view and in addressing “why”, it is suggested here that the 
concept of competence or the lack of it is the problem. 
In his review of “Texas City Refinery Explosion: Lessons Learned”, Mogford [6] mentions five 
underlying causes, all management responsibilities and two in particular are linked to the theme 
of this paper: 
“Secondly, process safety, operations performance and systematic risk reduction 
priorities had not been set nor consistently reinforced by management. Safety lessons 
from other parts of BP were not acted on. 
And finally, poor performance management and vertical communication in the refinery 
meant there was no adequate early warning system of problems and no independent 
means of understanding the deteriorating standards in the plant through thorough audit of 
the organisation.” 
This is reinforced in the Baker [7] commission report for BP,  
“Recommendation #3 
– process safety knowledge and expertise 
BP should develop and implement a system to ensure that its executive management, its 
refining line management above the refinery level, and all U.S. refining personnel, 
including managers, supervisors, workers, and contractors, possess an appropriate level 
of process safety knowledge and expertise.” 
 
BP and many other companies have done much in progressing this idea, yet CCPS’s Guidelines 
for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems (2nd edition 2011) places “Training and 
Performance Assurance” at p547 out of 835, and this really returns to the start of this paper, if 
the senior management don’t understand 
The Process Safety First Equation of State; 
 
Safety Practice (SP) =  
F (Materials of Construction (Mc), Property of Materials (Pm), Reaction Kinetics (Rk), Effect of 
Fires & Explosions (Efe)),  
 
Just understanding Cash Flow, Six Sigma, Coaching & Leadership and all the other chapters of 
“How to be an Even Better Manager: A Complete A-Z of Proven Techniques and Essential 
Skills” or some other book of that ilk, is not being a manager and the anthology of Process safety 
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